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Abstract 
Purpose – This is the first REIT paper to seek to empirically examine potential influencing factors on the 
discounts and underwriting fees of Australian REIT rights issues. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Using a methodology similar to Owen and Suchard, and Armitage, a sample 
of 62 A-REIT rights issues during 2001-2009 is analyzed. A variety of potential factors influencing discounts 
and underwriting fees are explored. 
 
Findings – Over A$20 billion was raised by A-REIT rights issues during 2001-2009 (this around three times 
that raised through A-REIT initial public offerings during the same period). The mean offer price was 
discounted around 9.5 percent from the current market price and underwriting fees averaged 2.9 percent of gross 
proceeds raised – both substantially less than for industrial rights issues. The standard deviation of daily returns 
for the past year appears to influence the percentage discount offered to subscribers. This volatility was 
particularly noticeable in 2008 and 2009, during the global financial crisis, where new issues were discounted 
substantially so as to raise equity to repay debt. This historical risk variable appears paramount in determining 
the discounts to subscribers and fees to underwriters. 
 
Practical implications – A-REITs seeking to minimize the discounts offered to subscribers and to minimize 
their underwriting costs with rights issue equity capital raisings must first minimize their share price volatility. 
 
Originality/value – This paper adds to the international costs of capital raising literature of REITs by 
examining such costs with A-REIT rights issues and is the first paper to examine factors influencing these costs. 
Keyword(s): Costs of raising capital; Rights issues; Equity capital; Underwriting; A-REITs; Australia. 
 
1 Introduction 
Australian real estate investment trusts (A-REITs) are important investment vehicles that manage around $150 
billion in property assets (PIR, 2011) and account for over 6 percent of the market capitalization of the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) as at March 2012 (FinAnalysis, 2012). In comparison to unlisted wholesale 
property funds, unlisted retail property funds and property syndicates, A-REITs have a higher value of assets 
under management by far (about double that of the wholesale funds and triple that of the retail funds) (PIR, 
2011). Major institutions and superannuation funds (such as ING, Vanguard, Colonial First State, La Salle 
Investment Management, AMP and Morgan Stanley) have substantial monies invested in A-REITs. At 
Westfield Group alone, Australia's largest REIT capitalized at over $20 billion at 27 March 2012, all institutions 
(including mutual funds) accounted for over 83 percent of the share register (SNL, 2012). 
Since A-REITs operate as trusts however, they must distribute all of their profits to their unit holder 
beneficiaries. As a consequence, these A-REITs cannot rely on internally generated funds to grow their assets 
under management or to repay loans and consequently they often raise secondary equity capital by way of rights 
issues. Raising this secondary capital is not, however, without its costs. To the authors knowledge, this is the 
first paper to empirically examine potential influencing factors on the discounts and underwriting fees 
associated with rights issues. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate two major costs incurred by A-REITs seeking to raise secondary 
equity capital by way of rights issues. Smith (1977), Eckbo and Masulis (1992), Armitage (2000) and Chen and 
Wu (2002) all explain the impact of issue costs on net proceeds raised for industrial companies. The first cost 
examined is the direct cost of underwriting these rights issues. The direct costs incurred by the company include 
legal costs, accounting costs, printing costs and underwriting costs but largest of these, by far, is the 
underwriting cost. The second cost is the indirect cost of the discount offered to subscribers to encourage them 
to exercise their right to buy more shares in the listed entity. The indirect cost incurred as a consequence of the 
rights issue is generally identified as the offer price discount to the current market share price and often 
represents a substantial cost of equity capital raising (Lee et al., 1996; Ritter, 1987; Kooli and Suret, 2003). 
By way of further background, PIR (2011) reports that assets under management for the A-REIT sector (as 
measured by the S&P/ASX 200 A-REIT index) grew from around $80 billion in 2003 to over $200 billion in 
2008 and 2009. Leverage on the other hand, was around 40 percent in 2003 and grew to 50 percent into by 
2009. The global financial crisis (GFC) period forced the A-REIT sector to reduce leverage levels, which in turn 
reduced assets under management. This study finds that all the rights issues capital raising done during the GFC 
period was used to repay debt. Dimovski (2011) identifies that while Westfield was fortunate enough to raise 
over $3 billion by rights issue before the GFC, others like GPT and Stockland had to raise $2.8 billion and $1.8, 
respectively, during 2008 and 2009. 
Rights issues are a common method available to REITs that seek to raise additional equity capital in Australia 
but they are not common in the USA. (The other method is the private placement of equity capital to a few, 
often institutional investors. Private placements can often be arranged in a few days, but are limited to raising no 
more than 15 percent of the issued capital in any one year. The private placements can also dilute the 
proportional ownership of the existing owners. Private placements were often used however at the onset of the 
GFC to raise some equity quickly). In Australia, a renounceable rights issue describes where a listed entity 
offers existing shareholders or unit holders the right to buy new shares or units on a pro rata basis to their 
current share or unit holding. Shareholders then have three options available to them. First, they can accept the 
right to buy the additional shares or units, second, they can renounce (sell) their right to buy those shares or 
units, or third, they can let the right expire. Taking up the right and purchasing the pro rated shares or units 
ensures shareholders maintain their proportional stake in the listed entity, however renouncing the right or 
letting it expire dilutes the existing shareholder's proportional stake. A non-renounceable or entitlement rights 
issue allows the shareholder to either buy more shares in the entity or to let the right to buy expire. 
This study investigates 62 A-REIT rights issues from January 2001 to June 2009. Underwriting fees averaged 
2.9 percent of gross proceeds raised and the offer price was discounted on average 9.5 percent from the current 
market share price. This study reports that the rights issue costs are substantially than those reported in industrial 
and mining company studies around the world. 
Importantly, this study finds that the standard deviation of daily returns for the past 250 days appears to 
significantly influence the discount. This high volatility was particularly evident with issues in 2008 and 2009, 
during the GFC, which were significantly discounted so as to repay loans and strengthen balance sheets. The 
standard deviation of daily returns for the past 250 days also appears to significantly influence the underwriting 
fee. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section reviews relevant rights issue capital raising literature. 
Section 3 describes the data and presents the models and results. Section 4 makes some concluding comments. 
2 Related literature 
This section contains two parts. The first part focuses on the previous literature investigating the underwriting 
costs of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) including rights issues and factors previously found to influence these 
costs. The second part addresses the indirect cost of the discount offered to subscribers to the new shares 
available as a result of these rights issues and factors found to influence this indirect cost. 
Underwriting costs in seasoned equity issues literature 
The underwriting fee paid to underwriters represents a substantial part of the direct costs of raising secondary 
equity capital. The direct costs are the out-of-pocket expenses an issuing firm pays. 
Even from the earliest studies, it is clear that direct costs represent a significant proportion of gross proceeds 
raised. Smith (1977)studied 94 US rights offerings between 1971 and 1975 and found the average direct cost to 
be 6.05 percent for standby underwriting agreements (3.6 percent for the underwriting component) and only 
2.45 percent for rights offerings without an underwriter. Also in the US markets, Lee et al. (1996) examined 
1,593 SEOs from 1990 to 1994 and reported an average direct cost of 7.11 percent of which 5.44 percent was 
the underwriting cost. Corwin (2003) followed and used a large sample of 4,454 US SEOs from 1980 to 1998 
and reported an average direct cost of 6.65 percent of which 5.32 percent was the underwriter spread. 
Armitage (2000) studied 928 UK rights issues between 1985 and 1996 and found the average direct cost to be 
5.78 percent of gross proceeds raised from the issue of which the underwriting cost was only 1.53 percent but 
this figure is computed from an average of both underwritten and non-underwritten rights issues. Martín-Ugedo 
(2003) examined 57 rights issues from 1989 to 1997 in the Spanish market and reported an average underwriting 
cost of around 2 percent. Chen and Wu (2002) reported a very low average direct cost of 2.85 percent in the 
Hong Kong market using a sample of 384 SEOs between 1991 and 1996. They noted that the underwriter 
component of direct costs was not explicitly given in many prospectuses. 
In early Australian work, Chan (1997) using a sample of 111 Australian rights issues from 1987 to 1993 found 
underwriting fees averaged 1.71 percent. In more recent work Owen and Suchard (2008) investigating 207 
Australian rights issues from 1993 to 2001 report an average underwriting cost of 4.02 percent. 
While the studies above explore industrial and mining entities, there are three studies that specifically explore 
underwriting costs related to REITs but all are on the underwriting costs of REIT initial public offerings (IPOs) 
rather than secondary equity capital raisings. Chen and Lu (2006) investigated 197 US REIT IPOs from 1980 to 
1999 and report a clustering of gross spreads of 7.0 percent in the 1980s and 6.5 percent in the 1990s 
while Dimovski (2006) investigated 57 A-REIT IPOs during 1994-2004 to find underwriting costs of around 3.3 
percent. The third study is by Kutsuna et al. (2008) on the underwriting fees of Japanese REIT (J-REIT) IPOs. 
Fees ranged from 3.5 to 5 percent, but the majority of J-REITs paid 3.5 percent of the proceeds raised. 
Underwriting cost influencing factors 
There are many suggested influencing factors expected to have an impact upon the underwriting costs. They 
include: 
Economies of scale 
Both Armitage (2000) and Martín-Ugedo (2003) suggest that the size of the gross proceeds raised by the firm 
and the direct cost of raising, including underwriting costs should be inversely related. In other words, 
economies of scale should be expected. This is logical in that the fixed costs of underwriting could be spread 
over greater proceeds and lower proportional underwriting costs should result. Both Armitage 
(2000) and Martín-Ugedo (2003) found that the size of the issue was negatively related to total capital raising 
costs. Other studies support the hypothesis that economies of scale exist in the equity capital raising markets. 
These include Smith (1977)and Lee et al. (1996) for SEOs and Ritter (1987) and Kooli and Suret (2003) for 
IPOs. 
Ownership concentration 
Hansen and Pinkerton (1982) suggested total direct costs should decrease as ownership concentration increases. 
In relation to rights issues, recall that shareholders who do not take up the right to buy more shares could be 
diluted. As such, underwriters should find it easier to sell to such larger owners who would not rationally want 
to be diluted. Martín-Ugedo (2003), Armitage (2000), Hansen and Pinkerton (1982), Eckbo and Masulis 
(1992) and Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) in the US markets all support the ownership concentration theory. 
Discount 
Armitage (2000) hypothesised that the deeper the discount the lower the underwriter fee. This is because with a 
large discount, the insurance and marketing parts of the underwriting costs should be lower. While this was not 
found to be significant in either Armitage (2000) or Martín-Ugedo (2003), the variable has intuitive appeal. 
Percentage underwritten 
Armitage (2000) and Martín-Ugedo (2003) both argue that the percentage underwritten has high explanatory 
power in determining the total cost of the issue. It would also be expected that underwriting costs (and risks) 
could reduce as the amount underwritten reduces.Armitage (2000) reports that 42 percent of the issues in his UK 
study were less than fully underwritten. In this A-REIT study, only 16 percent were less than fully underwritten. 
Issuer risk 
Issuer risk is suggested in Armitage (2000) and Martín-Ugedo (2003) and measured as the standard deviation of 
company daily returns for one year prior to the announcement date. It could be expected that the entity with 
more volatile share returns might be riskier to the underwriter and hence may attract higher underwriting 
costs. Armitage (2000) and Martín-Ugedo (2003) record mixed results. 
Indirect costs 
Indirect costs can also result from the new issue but are not expenses that need to be actually paid out. The 
predominate indirect cost of rights issues is the discount which is the difference between the offer price and the 
market closing price the day before the issue announcement day. Management time and effort on the rights issue 
is another indirect cost of equity raising. 
Discount 
A large amount of discounting or “underpricing” literature exists but the results differ dramatically across the 
studies. In early work,Bacon (1972) reported an average underpricing of 18.54 percent using a sample of 72 US 
rights issues from 1965 to 1968. Smith (1977)however found the discount to range between 0.5 and 0.8 percent 
of gross proceeds. Armitage (2000) reported an average discount for rights issues of 21 percent. Owen and 
Suchard (2008) found an average 84.5 percent of rights issues were priced at a discount to the previous day's 
closing price and that the average discount for the sample of Australian rights issues was 18.9 percent. 
Management time and effort 
The literature has also acknowledged the existence of management's time and effort working on rights issue as 
another indirect cost.Kooli and Suret (2003), Chen and Wu (2002) and Ritter (1987) admit that these costs could 
be high but they are not easily measured. As a result, no study to date has attempted to capture this indirect cost. 
The net effect of this cost's exclusion however is to understate the indirect costs of rights issues. 
Theoretical explanations for the discount 
Bacon (1972) discussed the possibility of the rights issue subscription price being set above the market price and 
suggested it would be extremely unlikely that a rational investor would subscribe to such an issue. The price 
setting however, could be particularly interesting if the share price tends to vary widely. Bacon (1972) found 
that the greater the price discount offered in the rights issue, the higher the likelihood of success of the issue. He 
also acknowledged that the greater the discount, the more shares offered to raise a given amount, the greater the 
impact on earnings per share and likely, the more adverse the share price performance of the firm following the 
issue. Armitage (1998) explained however that because rights issues are initially offered to existing 
shareholders, their proportional interest in the firm would not be diluted and their overall value would not be 
diminished. While many theories explaining the discounts or underpricing of equity capital have been promoted, 
most of them have been developed in the IPO literature. Loderer et al.(1991) suggest that these theories could 
also apply to secondary equity offerings. 
Asymmetric information and uncertainty 
Rock (1986) developed the winner's curse hypothesis based on the argument that there are broadly two types of 
investors who know unequal amounts of information, the more informed and the less informed. More informed 
investors will invest in more profitable (higher underpriced) issues and therefore uninformed investors are left 
with a disproportionately large share of less profitable (lower underpriced) issues. He argued that some discount 
or underpricing is necessary to compensate these less informed investors for participating in these equity 
offerings. Beatty and Ritter (1986) support this argument and suggest there is a positive relationship between 
uncertainty and underpricing, the greater the uncertainty about an equity issue, the greater the underpricing 
required to entice investors to subscribe. Corwin (2003) suggested that information asymmetry should be lower 
with SEOs than for IPOs but could still exist. He did in fact find that SEOs were more underpriced the higher 
the uncertainty about the issuer's price. 
Three variables are often used to proxy for information asymmetry and uncertainty. The first is the volatility of 
daily returns, which is estimated from closing stock prices. The hypothesis being that the larger the standard 
deviation of daily returns the larger the discount required to attract investors (Corwin, 2003; Owen and Suchard, 
2008). The second variable is the market capitalization – with larger entities generally associated with less 
information asymmetry and a lower discount (Corwin, 2003; Owen and Suchard, 2008). The third variable often 
utilised is the mean daily trading volume – with lower volume share trading associated with more information 
asymmetry (Corwin, 2003; Owen and Suchard, 2008; Wu, 2004). 
Price pressure 
Corwin (2003) also suggested the offer size of seasoned equity offers could result in downward share price 
pressures. In other words, a decrease in stock price could well result from an increase in the supply of shares 
into the market and the discount is necessary to compensate investors for the additional cash required from them 
to maintain their proportional holding. 
Underwriter status 
While no underwriter status measures are presently obvious in the Australian market as Carter and Manaster 
(1990) introduced in the US market, the influence of underwriters on equity issues is undoubted. Carter and 
Manaster (1990) found that higher reputation underwriters are associated with lower underpriced offerings. 
Interestingly more recent work by Cooney et al. (2001) has found a positive relationship between underwriter 
reputation and the level of underpricing in IPOs. 
Ratio of new for existing 
Ratio is the ratio of new shares or units offered to the existing number of shares or units held. This variable was 
introduced by Corwin (2003) in analysing the discount offered suggests the higher the proportional equity 
sought, the greater the pressure on the discount. 
Owen and Suchard (2008) also test other variables for their impact on the price discount. They suggest the 
volatility variable of the standard deviation one year prior to the announcement date and ownership 
concentration, which is the percentage shareholding of the top 20 shareholders prior to the announcement date. 
3 Data, models and results 
All A-REIT rights issue prospectuses issued during the period January 2001 to June 2009 were collected from 
the FinAnalysis database. In addition, relevant annual reports and Appendix 3B “New issue announcements” to 
the ASX were collected using FinAnalysis and SNL Real Estate. The prospectuses and Appendix 3Bs provided 
the underwriting fee information. In addition, the gross proceeds, prospectus date, percentage underwritten, the 
percentage held by the top 20 shareholders, new for existing share ratio, market capitalization, the 
renouceability or otherwise of the rights and the offer price of the rights issues were obtained from the these 
documents. FinAnalysis and SNL Real Estate were also used to collect the daily closing share price and the 
daily trading volumes data for each entity. 
Table I provides some of the A-REIT rights issue characteristics. In brief, during the 2001 to mid-2009 period a 
total of over A$20 billion of new equity capital was raised by the 62 A-REIT rights issues which is around three 
times that raised through A-REIT IPOs during the same period. Panel A shows a fairly steady number of rights 
issues in each calendar year except for the tight credit periods of 2002 and 2008. Underwriters were used in 58 
of the 62 issues while eight of the 62 offered a renounceable rights issue. Nearly five in ten offered stapled 
securities. Stapled securities are securities that are bound together and cannot be traded separately (bought or 
sold on the stock exchange). These securities are normally a unit in a trust and a share in a company. Many A-
REITs specifically identified the purpose for which the funds were raised and this is identified in the prospectus. 
As expected 15 out of 15 in 2008 and 2009 raised equity through the rights issues to repay loans. Interestingly in 
2007 five of the 12 rights issuers raised equity to repay loans while seven intended purchasing new properties 
with the proceeds. 
Panel B reports the continuous variable characteristics and shows the average offer price discount from the 
current market price was around 9.5 percent (median 7.7 percent) while the range of this discount was 47.8 
percent to a premium of 15.5 percent. The underwriting fees averaged around 2.9 percent (median 2.8 percent). 
The average proceeds raised were A$354.2 million while the proceeds ranged from A$1.63 million to A$3.032 
billion by the Westfield Group. The average percentage of stock held by the top 20 shareholders was 63.8 
percent while this percentage holding ranged from 16 to 89.2 percent. The percentage underwritten averaged 93 
percent but ranged from 0 to 100 percent. The standard deviation of daily returns for 250 days before the rights 
issue averaged 2.5 percent but ranged from 0.8 to 8.9 percent while the new for existing ratio averaged 0.458 for 
1 and ranged from 0.7 new shares for every existing share to one new share for every one existing share. 
Analysis of the variables that may influence the percentage underwriter fee (PERCUFEE) of rights issues is 
conducted using the following regression model: Equation 1 Most of these variables have been previously used 
in industrial company studies and were explained in the related literature section. A summary description of 
these variables is also provided in Table II. Three additional variables are included in this model because they 
are intuitively appealing. They are POST2007, STAPLED and RENOUNCEABLE and explained now. 
The GFC and 2008-2009 
Included in some of the professional literature during this period, BDO Corporate Finance (2009a) reported that 
only one of 61 A-REITs they surveyed earned a positive return to 31 December 2008; that 14 A-REITs 
suspended distributions; that since 2002, A-REITs were priced below their net tangible assets (NTA) and that 
nine out of ten entities recorded falls in the values their properties. BDO Wealth Management (2009b) more 
recently advised that the S&P/ASX300 A-REIT accumulation index lost 57 percent while the S&P/ASX300 
accumulation index lost 29 percent for the 12 months to 30 April 2009. This 2008-2009 period has clearly been 
difficult for A-REITs who have tried to raise new equity to strengthen balance sheets and provide more 
comfortable leverage ratios. Dimovski (2009) identified the Centro earnings revision and refinancing 
announcements on 17 December 2007 as a critical event date identifying nine of the 25 largest A-REITs 
recorded statistically significant negative abnormal returns while the systematic risk for a great many A-REITs 
moved significantly higher raising their cost of capital substantially higher. This POST2007 variable tests 
whether underwriting costs have also increased during this tight credit period. 
Stapled 
Many A-REITs have in more recent times issued STAPLED securities. These securities generally consist of a 
unit in a trust (that is likely to hold rental income producing real estate) and a share in a company (that is likely 
to be involved in property development activities). It is likely that entities engaged in property development 
activities are considered more risky and hence may be more costly to underwrite. As such, stapled securities are 
expected to be positively related to underwriting fees. This higher risk characteristic of stapled securities 
suggests the rights issue discount might also need to be higher than for the conventional unit type security. 
Renounceable or non-renounceable 
Renounceable rights, because they can be sold to another party to take up the right to buy the new shares or 
units may be seen to be less risky to the underwriter than non-renounceable rights. As such, renounceable rights 
issues are expected to be negatively related to underwriting fees and hence underwriting costs are expected to be 
lower for renounceable rights issues. This lower risk characteristic of renounceable rights issues suggests that 
the discount also does not need to be as deep as it might with non-renounceable rights issues. 
To explore the discount or underpricing of the rights issue capital raising, the following regression model is 
used: Equation 2 DISCOUNT is the discount measured as ((market share price – offer price)/market share price) 
in percent. The market share price is the closing share price the day before announcement date. The other 
variables have been previously identified and were discussed in the related literature section. Again the βs are 
the coefficient estimates and ɛ is the residual with an assumed zero mean and constant variance. 
Table III reports the regression results for the factors influencing the underwriting fees in the A-REIT rights 
issue capital raisings during 2001-2009. Column 1 reports the coefficients and p-values for all the variables. The 
POST2007 and STDDEVBEFORE variables appeared to be highly correlated with each other so regressions 
utilising one of these variable at a time has been reported in columns 2 and 3. One observation had an 
underwriting fee over three standard deviations from the mean. This outlier observation was removed, the 
models re-run and results reported in column 4. Where heteroskedasticity was a concern, the models 
utilised White (1980) and corrected parameter and p-values are reported. Standard regression diagnostic tests 
were completed (Jarque-Bera, White and Ramsey Reset) but are not reported. Adjusted R 2 results are reported. 
Heteroskedasticity presented itself as an issue and hence the standard errors were corrected using White 
(1980) and robust coefficients and p-values are identified and reported as necessary in Table III. 
Table III identifies that the standard deviation of daily returns for the past year is significantly positively related 
to underwriting costs. Clearly the pricing risk is of concern to underwriters. These results support the early work 
of Booth and Smith (1986) arguing that underwriter costs increase as information asymmetry 
increases. Dimovski (2011) also points out that they mean standard deviation of daily returns in the 250 days 
before the rights issue was only 1.8 percent, before 2008 but for 2008 and 2009 it was more than 2.5 times that, 
at 4.9 percent. Interestingly the size of the issue and the proportion of units owned by the top 20 shareholders do 
not appear to be significant in influencing underwriter costs. This suggests that even though very large amounts 
of rights issue equity may be sought (or even large amounts sought to be underwritten), that this does not appear 
to affect the percentage underwriting cost. Additionally, underwriters do not appear to be influenced by the 
larger percentage holding of the top 20 shareholders who one would expect to take up their right rather than be 
diluted. That is, underwriters do not appear to see higher top 20 holdings as a big advantage wanting of reduced 
fee. 
Table IV reports the regression results for the factors influencing the price discount in the rights issue capital 
raising. Column 1 reports the coefficients and p-values for all the variables. Column 2 removes one observation 
that had a price discount over three standard deviations from the mean (which happened to be the first rights 
issue capital raising in 2008 and as such the first during the GFC). Column 3 reports the results using fewer 
variables and the outlier observation remains removed. 
The results in Table IV show that discount of the offer price compared to the market price the day before the 
announcement was significantly higher for those rights issues with a higher standard deviation of returns. Again 
price (and therefore return) volatility is the major influence. What is also interesting is all the variables that do 
not appear to be statistically significant. The fact that the size of the capital raised and the percentage sought to 
be underwritten were not statistically significantly important is interesting. Large issues and larger percentages 
sought to be underwritten do not appear to affect the size of the discount. Additionally the model does not find 
the proportion of the share register held by the top 20 shareholders is statistically significant in regard the 
discount. One might have thought that those top 20 shareholders would be likely to subscribe to the rights issue 
(since they would not want to be diluted) and hence the discount may not have needed to be as high for those 
REITs with larger holdings by the top 20 shareholders. Out of interest in the A-REIT rights issue capital raised 
in 2008 and 2009, column 4 reports the results including the POST2007 variable instead of the 
STDDEVBEFORE variable (because the two are highly correlated) during the GFC. The price discount during 
this period, all other things held constant, was around 8.5 percent higher. 
4 Conclusion 
This paper adds to the international literature investigating the underwriting costs and share price discounts of 
A-REIT equity rights issues by investigating such issues during 2001-2009. The mean percentage underwriting 
cost of these issues amounted to 2.9 percent of gross proceeds with the mean discount of 9.5 percent – this is far 
lower than that found by Owen and Suchard (2008) with Australian industrial and mining company rights issue 
underwriting costs at 4.0 percent and gross discounts of 19 percent (and these latter means relate to rights issues 
well before the GFC). These lower underwriting and indirect costs suggest a substantially lower cost of equity 
capital raising for A-REITs compared to industrial and mining companies. The average underwriting costs of 
the rights issues are also lower than the average underwriting costs of A-REIT and J-REIT IPOs. This is 
consistent with the thoughts of Corwin (2003). 
The paper also adds to the international literature investigating potential influencing factors on the underwriting 
costs of these equity rights issues. The results identify the standard deviation of returns for the last 250 days as 
an important influence on the underwriting cost. Clearly the larger the standard deviation of returns the larger 
the percentage underwriting cost. So for A-REITs seeking to minimise their underwriting cost they must also 
minimise the share price volatility, which in turn influences the volatility of daily returns. 
The issuer risk is also found to influence the discount. The lower REITs can keep their share price volatility and 
hence their standard deviation of daily returns the lower the direct and indirect costs they incur. 
What is interesting is that most of the characteristics/variables that have been found useful to consider in 
influencing the underwriting fee and the discount in much of the previous literature, do not appear to be 
statistically significant in influencing such rights issue costs for A-REITs. Dimovski (2011) identified that the 
volatility of daily returns for A-REITs during the GFC period (2008-2009) was 2.5 times what it was before this 
period. This major increase in volatility may be why previous industrial company research, including Owen and 
Suchard (2008) utilising 1993-2001 data, did not identify the volatility of daily returns as a significant 
explanatory variable, but this study does. 
One variable in particular that is not significant in influencing percentage underwriting costs in this A-REIT 
sector study is the size of the capital raising. Interestingly, Bairagi and Dimovski (2012) report that the 
underwriting fees for US REIT SEOs are also not statistically significantly influenced by the size of the capital 
raising. It could be that REITs are generally expected to seek large amounts of seasoned equity capital from 
underwriters and investors. 
With regard factors influencing the discount in rights issues, Owen and Suchard (2008) find a significant 
positive relationship with relative issue size and a significant negative relationship with ownership concentration 
but such relationships are not found in this A-REIT study. As suggested before, A-REITs, because of their 
existing size, may well be expected to raise large sums through rights issues while the industrial and mining 
companies studied by Owen and Suchard (2008) appear to have a large variability in the size of capital raising. 
It is interesting that the degree of ownership concentration (percentage shareholding of top 20 shareholders) 
amongst these industrial and mining companies studied by Owen and Suchard (2008) and the A-REIT study 
here are broadly similar with respect their averages and standard deviations. It may be because the Owen and 
Suchard (2008) study used older, pre GFC lower volatility data, that ownership concentration declared itself as 
influential. 
The findings of this study of Australian REIT rights issues concurs with the findings of the Bairagi and 
Dimovski (2012) study on US REIT SEOs in that the level of share price volatility is important in influencing 
underwriting fees. Future research exploring explanatory characteristics in other REIT jurisdictions may help to 






Table I A-REIT rights issue characteristics 2001-2009 
 
Table II Variable description 
 
Table III Factors influencing underwriter fees 
 
Table IV Factors influencing the discount in rights issues 
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